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ABSTRACT
A number of development assistance programs promote community interaction as a means of building
social capital. Yet, despite strong theoretical underpinnings, the role of repeat interactions in sustaining
cooperation has proven difficult to identify empirically. We provide the first experimental evidence
on the economic returns to social interaction in the context of microfinance. Random variation in the
frequency of mandatory meetings across first-time borrower groups generates exogenous and persistent
changes in clients' social ties. We show that the resulting increases in social interaction among clients
more than a year later are associated with improvements in informal risk-sharing and reductions in
default. A second field experiment among a subset of clients provides direct evidence that more frequent
interaction increases economic cooperation among clients. Our results indicate that group lending
is successful in achieving low rates of default without collateral not only because it harnesses existing
social capital, as has been emphasized in the literature, but also because it builds new social capital
among participants.
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Social capital, famously dened by Putnam (1993) as \features of social organization, such as trust,
norms and networks, that can improve the eciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions,"
is thought to be particularly valuable in low-income countries where formal insurance is largely
unavailable and institutions for contract enforcement are weak.1 Since economic theory suggests
that repeated interactions among individuals can help build and maintain social capital (see, for
instance, Kreps et al., 1982), encouraging interaction could be an eective tool for development
policy. Indeed, numerous development assistance programs have introduced policies designed to
promote social contact among community members under the assumption that there are signicant
economic returns to regular interaction. But can simply inducing people to interact more often
actually increase economic cooperation?
While a large body of research nds a positive correlation between social interaction and
cooperative outcomes, rigorous empirical evidence on this subject remains limited, largely due to
the diculty of accounting for endogenous social ties (Manski, 1993, 2000). For instance, if more
cooperative individuals or societies are characterized by stronger or denser social networks, we
cannot assign a causal interpretation either to the positive association between community-level
social ties and public goods provision or to the higher levels of cooperation observed among friends
as compared to strangers in laboratory public goods games.2 In short, without randomly varying
social distance, it is dicult to validate the basic model of returns to repeated interaction and even
harder to determine whether small changes in social interaction can produce tangible returns.
This paper undertakes precisely this exercise in the context of a development program that
1Consistent with this idea, Guiso et al. (2004) demonstrate that residents in high social capital regions engage in
more sophisticated nancial transactions, and Knack and Keefer (1997) show that a country's level of trust correlates
positively with its growth rate.
2The public good provision and community ties literature includes Costa and Kahn (2003); Alesina and Ferrara
(2002); DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999); Miguel et al. (2005); Olken (2009), while examples of laboratory games
include Glaeser et al. (2000); Carter and Castillo (2004); Do et al. (2009); Karlan (2005); Ligon and Schecter (2008).
Another shortcoming in the community ties and public goods literature is the use of survey-generated measures of
propensity to cooperate, which are often inconsistent with incentivized trust measures generated by laboratory games
(Glaeser et al., 2000).
2emphasizes group interaction { micronance. In the typical \Grameen Bank"-style micronance
program, clients meet weekly in groups to make loan payments. In addition to facilitating debt
collection, these meetings encourage regular interaction among members of highly localized commu-
nities.3 To evaluate the economic returns to increased social contact that result from participation
in group lending, we randomly assigned rst-time borrower groups of a micronance institution
(MFI) in India to meet either once per week (weekly groups) or once per month (monthly groups).4
We show that mandated dierences in meeting frequency over a ten-month period generated
persistent dierences in individuals' knowledge of and social contact with group members: Five
months into the loan cycle, clients in weekly groups were 90% more likely to have visited other
group members in their homes, and more than a year after their loan cycle ended they were 40%
more likely to attend social events together and visited one another 19% more often outside of
loan meetings. These gains were concentrated among clients who did not know each other well
before joining the MFI but had the ability to sustain social contact either through extended family
networks or geographic proximity.
Furthermore, reducing social distance had signicant economic returns. Clients required to
meet more frequently in the experimental loan cycle were 19% more likely to report nancial trans-
fers with people outside of their immediate family and 29% more likely to say that they would ask
another (former) group member for help in the event of a health emergency. They were also four
times less likely to default on their subsequent loan (during which all clients met at the same fre-
quency, irrespective of whether they had earlier been in weekly or monthly groups). While in theory
it is possible that more frequent repayment directly inuenced default via long-run dierences in
nancial discipline, several pieces of evidence indicate that social ties were the central channel of
inuence. Perhaps most striking, the reduction in default among weekly clients depended heavily
3In an anthropological study of Grameen Bank clients, Larance (2001) describes the social aspects of weekly
activities such as \walking across the village to attend the center meeting, sitting in conversation with a diverse set
of women, handling money for the group and receiving personal address."
4In a similar spirit, Humphreys et al. (2009) randomize community development programs and show that they
encourage prosocial behavior. However, they are unable to identify the inuence of social interactions, per se.
3on those group characteristics { fraction of extended family members and close neighbors in the
group { that predicted dierences in social capital formation. Importantly, these characteristics do
not directly inuence default.
Not only do these results imply that development programs can readily generate economically
valuable social capital, but they provide an alternative explanation for the success of the classic
group lending model in achieving low rates of default without the use of collateral. Although joint
liability is almost universally emphasized as the key to mitigating default risk in group lending,
our results show that improvements in informal risk-sharing arrangements that develop among
clients in individual-liability lending groups signicantly improve repayment rates. Further, recent
experimental evidence suggests that joint liability has little impact on default (Karlan and Gine,
2009). Our results also provide a rationale for the current trend among MFIs of maintaining
repayment in group meetings despite the transition from group to individual liability contracts
(Karlan and Gine, 2009).
To gather direct evidence on economic cooperation among clients and disentangle mechanisms
through which repeat interaction improves cooperation, we designed and implemented a second
eld experiment (roughly sixteen months after the group meeting experiment ended). This lottery
experiment provided a unique opportunity to elicit clients' willingness to share risk with group
members in a setting that did not trigger subjects' awareness of being participants in an experiment.5
Each client entered a separate lottery in which she started with a 1 in 11 chance of winning a Rs.
200 ( $5) promotional coupon. She was oered the opportunity to give out additional lottery
tickets to any number of members of her rst MFI group, reducing her individual probability of
winning but increasing the probability that someone from the group would win. Since ticket-giving
increases her expected payo if and only if group members could be trusted to share their winnings
an individual's willingness to give tickets captures the \resource potential" of her MFI network.
5Subjects' awareness of being scrutinized has been shown to inuence laboratory measures of pro-social behavior.
In a recent overview of this literature, Levitt and List (2009) argue that individuals' pro-social behavior in framed
or artifactual experiments is likely to depend on the nature and degree of others' scrutiny, the context in which a
decision is embedded and the selection of participants, which signicantly limits the generalizability of these results.
4To distinguish insurance motivations for sharing from unconditional altruism, we varied the
form of lottery prize, randomly assigning each client to a lottery in which the prize was either one
Rs. 200 voucher or four Rs. 50 vouchers. Assuming the more easily divisible prize is perceived
as more conducive to sharing by the winner, a client will be more likely to give tickets to group
members when the prize is divisible if she is motivated at least in part by risk-sharing considerations
but no more likely if she is motivated only by seless altruism.6 Consistent with this, we nd that,
relative to a monthly client, a client who had been in a weekly group was 67% more likely to enter
a group member into the lottery when the prize was divisible but no more likely when it was not.
Further, in line with our earlier results we nd that increased ticket-giving by weekly clients is
driven by increased giving to close neighbors and extended family.
Why do more frequent meetings facilitate risk-sharing? We exploit a unique feature of our
experimental setting to evaluate the importance of learning about fellow group members types
(level of impatience, trustworthiness, etc.), which implies only short-term benets of more frequent
interaction, versus the possibility that regular interaction indenitely improved risk-sharing capacity
by increasing clients' eective discount factors or ability to implement punishment and reward
schemes that mitigate opportunistic behavior. At the time of the lottery, a subset of participants
were on a subsequent loan cycle in which their group had been re-randomized into weekly or
monthly repayment schedules. This provides experimental variation in the frequency of mandatory
interactions between group members at two points: once when they are new to each other and once
when they have been interacting regularly for almost two years. Clients randomly assigned to meet
frequently in both loan cycles give signicantly more tickets than clients required to interact at a
high frequency only in the beginning. We interpret this as evidence that, in addition to any learning
eects that hasten the formation of reciprocal arrangements, higher meeting frequency also helps
6Similar variations of dictator or trust games have been used to parse out motives for giving in laboratory
experiments. See for instance Ligon and Schecter (2008); Do et al. (2009); Carter and Castillo (2003). Perhaps
closest to our approach is Gneezy et al. (2000), who use a sequence of trust games with varying constraints on the
amount that can be repaid in the second round to show that individuals contribute more when large repayments are
feasible.
5sustain cooperation by reducing the costs or increasing the benets of coordinating actions.
Our ndings compliment existing work on micronance, which has identied a role for social
connections in reducing default risk (Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Karlan,
2005).7 Our contributions are to generate and use random variation in social ties to establish
a causal eect of social interaction on cooperation that we cannot safely conclude from previous
studies (given the possibility of selection into social networks), and, in doing so, to demonstrate that
small changes in program design (here, the structure of the loan contract) can have a signicant
eect on social capital. With respect to micronance, our ndings illustrate that the most popular
form of group lending not only harnesses social capital through joint liability contracts but actually
builds social capital among group members by encouraging regular social contact.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the study setting and
experimental design. Section 3 documents the implications of meeting frequency for clients' social
and nancial behavior. Section 4 uses our second eld experiment to disentangle channels through
which increases in social interaction increased economic cooperation, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Setting and Experimental Design
Our partner MFI, Village Welfare Society (VWS), started operations in the Indian state of West
Bengal in 1982. At the start of our eld experiments, it had roughly 6.75 million dollars in outstand-
ing loans to over 56,000 female clients. According to the baseline survey, over 70% of households
in our sample owned a micro-enterprise, 30% report signicant health shocks in the twelve months
prior to taking out a loan, and less than 40% had a savings account or formal insurance, suggesting
potentially signicant returns to informal risk-sharing among group members.
Like most MFIs, VWS loan groups typically consist of clients from a single neighborhood,
which implies that members live in close proximity and are acquainted prior to joining. However,
7For instance, MFI clients in Peru who are more trustworthy in a trust game are less likely to default, and
group-level default is lower in groups where clients have stronger social connections (Karlan, 2005, 2007).
6while 67% of group members in our sample knew one another at group formation, most described
their relationship with other group members as neighbors (51%), acquaintances (6%), or strangers
(27%), rather than friends (7%) or family (9%).
The basic loan group works as follows: After clients are screened and groups approved by
loan ocers, members choose a group leader in whose home the loan ocer will conduct weekly
repayment meetings for the duration of the loan cycle. The rst two meetings are for group nurturing
and training, and loan repayment starts in the third week. During each meeting clients take an
oath promising to make regular repayment, after which the loan ocer collects payment from each
member individually and marks passbooks.8 Loan cycles last for forty four weeks and all clients must
attend meetings for at least twenty weeks, after which point they may repay the remaining balance
in a single installment. In our sample the median weekly group met thirty seven times during a
single loan cycle and the average meeting length was twenty-ve minutes (excluding waiting time).
For the experiment, between April and September 2006 we recruited one hundred new ten-
member borrower groups of rst-time clients from neighborhoods in the catchment areas of three
VWS branches.9 At the time of recruitment, clients were told that repayment schedules would be
determined by lottery. Before loan disbursal, we randomly assigned thirty groups to the standard
weekly repayment schedule and seventy groups to a monthly repayment schedule.10 Each client
received a Rs. 4000 ( $100) loan, a reasonably large amount given that the average client had
assets worth $250 at baseline. Clients assigned to the weekly schedule were required to repay their
loans through 44 weekly installments of Rs. 100 starting two weeks after loan disbursal, and those
assigned to the monthly schedule in eleven Rs. 400 installments starting one month after loan
8A client's repayment behavior is, thus, observable to other group members, although, in practice most clients
socialize while awaiting their turn. While a client can repay at a branch this occurred very rarely. However, once a
majority of clients in a group have repaid their loan, VWS asks remaining clients to repay at the branch oce.
9Loan ocers aimed to form ten-member groups. In practice, group size ranged between eight and thirteen
members, with 77% of the groups consisting of ten members.
10We originally intended to have two monthly repayment treatment arms: One that met weekly and one that met
monthly. In practice, weekly meetings among clients required to repay monthly broke down almost immediately,
and clients ended up meeting on a monthly basis for most of their loan cycle. On average the weekly-monthly and
monthly-monthly groups ended up meeting 10.13 and 10 times.
7disbursal. No client dropped out after her repayment schedule was announced.
Between group formation and loan disbursement, we administered a baseline survey to 1016
of the 1026 clients. Table 1 and Appendix Table 1 provide a randomization check based on these
data. On average, monthly and weekly clients look similar at baseline across a wide range of
observable characteristics. No baseline characteristics out of 30 are signicantly dierent at a 5%
level, and only two dierences are statistically signicant at the 10% level: whether a client is
Muslim and the number of years she has lived in her neighborhood. While monthly clients have
been in their neighborhoods for slightly longer, the dierence is relatively small and is not associated
with dierences in degree of social ties. For instance, they were no more likely to describe another
group member as family or friend (Table 1, Panel B). We have also veried that the results are
robust to excluding groups with Muslim clients. However, because of these dierences, throughout
we report regressions with the controls listed in Table 1 and discuss any cases in which our results
are sensitive to the inclusion of controls.
3 Eect of Meeting Frequency on Client Behavior
To gauge the eect of meeting frequency on social capital formation, our study tracks clients for two
and a half loan cycles (roughly 100 weeks) beginning in April 2006. Appendix Figure 1 provides a
detailed timeline.
3.1 Social Capital Eects
We rst measure short-run changes in group members' social contact outside of repayment meetings
during the course of the experiment. To capture this, at the end of each meeting loan ocers asked
clients four questions about their knowledge of and interactions outside of meetings with other
group members. Since data were collected in a relatively public setting, to maintain a degree of
anonymity clients were asked to aggregate their interactions across group members.
8To capture the breadth of client interactions outside of meetings, each client was asked whether
all group members had visited her at home and whether she had visited all other group members in
their homes.11 For both outcomes, we construct an indicator that equals one if the client responded
in the armative at any group meeting. To capture clients' knowledge of group members, each
client was asked if she knew the names of her group members' husbands and children and whether
any of her group members had relatives visit in the last thirty days. For the rst measure, we
again construct an indicator that equals one if the client responded in the armative at any group
meeting, and for the second we average across all responses for a client. To avoid inferences based
on selected outcomes, we report eects for a \social contact index" which averages across these four
outcomes (Kling et al., 2007).12 Since clients often repay early but never before the sixth month, we
restrict the analysis to data from the rst ve months of the loan cycle.13 To balance observations
across weekly and monthly clients, we randomly choose one meeting per month for weekly clients.
Figure 1 shows that the fraction of clients who had visited all group members in their homes
rose sharply in the rst month and then increased gradually over the next ve months to nearly 45%,
and the fraction of clients who knew whether their group members had been visited by relatives
increased steadily from 0% to 7%. We observe similar patterns for fraction of clients visited by all
group members and knowledge of the names of family members of other group clients (unreported).
These patterns are consistent with a \dose response" to mandatory meetings, in which case weekly
groups should end up with higher levels of social contact. To test this, we aggregate social contact
data to the group level { since client responses may have been inuenced by being asked in a group
setting { and estimate for group g:
yg = 1Wg + Xg1 + g + g (1)
11Repayment meetings always occur at the group leader's house.
12The index is the equally weighted average of the four variables, with each variable normalized by subtracting
the mean for monthly clients and dividing by the standard deviation for these clients.
13Due to delays in implementing the group meeting survey, 1.9% of clients (20 clients) lack eight weeks of data,
4.8% (49 clients) lack data for 6 weeks, and 7.8% (80 clients) lack four weeks of data.
9where yg is the social capital index, Wg is an indicator for weekly group, g is a loan ocer xed
eect, and Xg is the set of group-level controls in Table 1. Regression results, presented in column
(1) of Table 2, indicate that moving from monthly to weekly repayment leads to a four standard
deviation increase in social contact outside of meetings.14
To examine whether changes in social contact persisted beyond the experiment and measure
individual social interactions in a more controlled setting, we visited a random sample of 432 clients
an average of 16 months after they had repaid their loan and collected survey data on the client's
perceptions of the trustworthiness of her previous (rst loan cycle) group members and her current
contact with these members.15 For consistency with short-run data collected during loan meetings,
our rst long-run contact measure is the number of times over the last thirty days the client had
visited with a previous group member in either person's home. The next two outcomes measure
the strength of social contact { whether the client still talks to the group member about family and
whether they celebrated the main Bengali festival (Durga Puja) together during the previous year.
Since we have roughly nine observations per client (all other group members), our analysis
sample contains 4018 pairwise observations. In order to avoid double-counting, in cases in which
we interviewed both members of a pair, we randomly drop one observation when the outcome is
social contact (which cannot vary, in the absence of measurement error, within a pair) and keep all
observations for outcomes that can dier within a pair. For member i matched with group member
m in group g we estimate
ygmi = 1Wg + Xg1 + Xi2 + 1Di + 2li + g + gmi (2)
where overlapping variables are dened as in equation (1), Di controls for number of days between
loan disbursement and survey, and li controls for being the group leader. Additional controls, listed
14In Appendix Table 2, we report the dierences for each of the index components (for ease of interpretation we
consider the non-normalized group outcomes). In each case, the magnitude of the eect is strikingly large. All results
are robust to excluding controls.
15The client also provided information on her relationship with each group member prior to joining VWS.
10in Table 1, are dened at the group- and individual- level (Xg and Xi respectively). Standard errors
are clustered by group.
According to the estimates in column (2) of Table 2, more than a year after graduating
from their rst loan cycle, clients who met weekly remain signicantly more likely to interact than
their monthly counterparts: Moving from a monthly to a weekly schedule leads to a 0.11 standard
deviation increase in long-run social contact between clients. The eect is similar in magnitude
but statistically insignicant without controls. Furthermore, all of the individual index components
indicate greater social contact among weekly clients and two out of three are statistically signicant
(Appendix Table 2). In sum, higher levels of friendship among weekly clients persisted long after
mandatory meetings ended.
Next, we examine how long-run changes in social contact varied across ve categories of
baseline social distance: (i) immediate family members and friends; (ii) relatives more than once
removed (distant relatives); (iii) neighbors living within a block (close neighbors); (iv) neighbors
living more than a block away (far neighbors); and (v) strangers.16 Column (3) reveals that increases
in long-run social contact that accrue to weekly groups are concentrated among client pairs who
are distant relatives and close neighbors. Reassuringly, we do not observe a change in social contact
among immediate relatives (the omitted group), and not surprisingly, we also observe no signicant
change among clients with few means of sustaining a social connection outside of group meetings
(those who were unknown prior to joining VWS or distant neighbors). These results are robust to
the exclusion of controls.
Looking directly at the component of the index that measures repeat interaction { number
of times the pair visited each other at home in the last thirty days { we observe that the average
weekly client pair meets 19% more often than their monthly counterpart, but the estimate is very
noisy (column (4)). However, when weekly is interacted with categories of initial social distance,
we observe large and signicant increases in meeting frequency where changes in social ties are
16Distances were measured using GPS coordinates collected at baseline. We dene a city block as living within a
50-meter radius, which is half of the distance used to dene city blocks in developed countries.
11most heavily concentrated - among distant family and close neighbors. Among weekly clients, close
neighbors see each other just as often as friends and family members once removed while in monthly
groups they see each other 27% less often.
The last two columns consider trust-based measures of social capital. The outcome in column
(6) is a client's perception of her average group member's trustworthiness.17 More than a year after
repaying the loan, those who were on a weekly schedule rank average group member trustworthiness
0.27 points higher (on a 1-5 scale) and the dierence is statistically signicant with or without
controls.18 In column (7), the outcome variable is the client's response to a hypothetical question on
whether she believes that a particular group member would help her in the event of illness. Weekly
clients are six percentage points more likely to report that a group member would provide assistance
in such an emergency (29%), which is statistically signicant with but not without controls.
3.2 Returns to Social Capital
According to the previous section, forcing people to meet more often for 6-10 months leads to
persistent increases in social ties. But do these social ties yield economic returns or simply change
patterns of friendship? Survey responses to a hypothetical scenario suggest that weekly clients are
also more willing to provide informal insurance to fellow group members (Table 2, column (7)), but
do informal risk-sharing arrangements develop in practice?
To test whether weekly meetings are associated with improvements in informal insurance, we
consider two measures of vulnerability to shocks: nancial transfers between individuals other than
immediate family and loan default. At the end of the rst loan cycle clients were administered a
survey that asked about the number and amount of transfers to and from individuals of fourteen
17Our regression specication is the individual level equivalent of equation (1).
18The client was described the following scenario: \Imagine a person walking down the street sees someone in
front of him/her drop their wallet. Upon inspection, she nds that the wallet contains Rs 200 and the owner's name
and phone number. The nder must decide whether to keep it or return it to its owner." She was asked to rank the
likelihood that the nder would return the wallet if she was her average group member on a 1-5 scale described as
follows: \1-Would not return the money. 2- Unless someone knows she has got the wallet, would not return it. 3-As
likely to return as not. 4- Will return, but might take up to a week. 5- Will return immediately."
12dierent relationship categories over the past year. Figure 2 shows the average transfers given by
a client by type of relationship. Overall, weekly clients give more transfers to all categories of
individuals except non-relatives who are neither friends nor neighbors, a category that is unlikely to
include members of a client's loan group. Among client pairs in the two categories where gains in
social ties are concentrated - friends (at endline), neighbors and other relatives - , total transfers are
28% higher among weekly clients. Since the majority of clients report no transfers, for regression
estimates we consider the binary outcome of whether the client reports any transfers to or from
individuals inside or outside of her immediate family rather than amount of transfer.
To measure default, we use VWS transactions data to track client repayment behavior during
both the experimental and the subsequent loan cycle. At the end of our loan experiment, 69% of
clients took out a second loan with VWS, and the rate did not dier across monthly and weekly
clients. On average, the second loan was 35% larger than the rst, and all clients repaid on a
fortnightly schedule.19 We consider a client in default on either loan if she failed to repay in full 44
weeks after the loan was due (roughly the length of an additional loan cycle).20
For both outcomes, we estimate OLS regressions of the form:
ygi = 1Wg + Xg1 + Xi2 + g + gi (3)
where variables and indices are dened as in Equation (2).
The results are presented in Table 3. Column (1) reveals that weekly clients are 19% more
likely to report transfers outside the family at the end of the experiment, and the dierence is
signicant at the 10% level. Furthermore, these transfers do not appear to displace transfers within
the immediate family or to individuals outside of the neighborhood (column (2)), suggesting a net
gain in informal insurance.
Since improvements in risk-sharing have implications for default rates, the next three columns
19Clients in the second loan cycle were subject to experimental variation in the timing of rst repayment, but it
was independent of their rst loan repayment schedule. See Appendix 7.3 for details.
20Results are very similar if we vary the time period over which default is dened.
13look at default in the experimental and subsequent loan cycles. Column (3) shows that frequent
meetings are not associated with lower default in the rst loan cycle. An important caveat is that
default is extremely low for rst-time borrowers (1.8%), presumably due to the fact that, following
standard MFI practice, rst loan sizes are below client demand for credit and \carrying capacity."
However, once clients have graduated to larger loans, dierences in default emerge despite the fact
that all clients have by that point converged to the same meeting frequency (fortnightly). Clients
assigned to monthly meetings for their rst loan are four times more likely to default on their
second loan relative to clients assigned to weekly meetings for their rst loan, and the dierence is
statistically signicant (column (4)).
Next we examine whether default reductions were concentrated among weekly clients most
likely to experience gains in social contact. The point estimates in column (5) indicate that this is the
case: There is a large and signicant eect of weekly meeting on default only among clients with a
sucient number of close neighbors and/or distant relatives in their group. This is reassuring since it
provides evidence that default patterns are not driven by the direct eect of meeting frequency. That
is, if the main channel of inuence were the meeting itself (e.g. the oath, loan ocer indoctrination,
ability to repay in small installments), we would not expect default rates to dier systematically
by features of group composition that do not directly predict default. We interpret the ndings in
Table 3 as prima facie evidence that meeting more frequently helped clients build stronger social
ties and then leverage these social ties to deal with shocks (and maintain repayment).
The ndings in Table 3 compliment Table 2 results in two ways: First, changes in social
contact that occur as a result of meeting regularly in loan groups have real economic returns and
therefore correspond to economically meaningful changes in social capital. Second, these measurable
returns to new relationships do not appear to be crowding out equally valuable relationships with
people outside of the loan group, as evidenced by lower overall vulnerability to shocks. Hence, we
can conclude that our intervention caused a net gain in social capital.
144 The Lottery: Disentangling Channels of Inuence
A shortcoming of our survey data is that we cannot directly observe instances of risk-sharing
between group members, only aggregate outcomes (total transfers and default). Hence, to gather
direct evidence on the eect of group meetings on economic cooperation and evaluate the potential
channels of inuence, we conducted a eld experiment in the form of a promotional lottery more
than a year after clients completed their rst loan cycle (average nal repayment and survey dates
were April 2007 and July 2008, respectively). Our experiment, a variant of laboratory dictator and
trust games (Forsythe et al., 1994; Berg et al., 1995), was designed to elicit willingness to form
risk-sharing arrangements in a eld setting.21
4.1 Design
We drew a random sample of 450 clients and successfully contacted 432 spread across 98 groups,
yielding a nal sample of 129 weekly and 321 monthly clients (see Appendix for details). Table
1 provides a randomization check using group-level (Panel A) and client-level (Panel B) variables.
Column (4) shows that the lottery sample is representative of the experimental population, and
columns (5) and (6) examine the balance of voucher randomization (described below) on multiple
characteristics. As before, the two characteristics which are unbalanced remain fraction Muslim
and years in the neighborhood. The weekly clients in the Rs. 200 voucher randomization also
have slightly fewer closer neighbors (compared to monthly counterparts). We continue to report
regressions with the full set of controls and report any instances where the results vary with controls.
The protocol was as follows: Surveyors approached each selected client in her house and
invited her to enter a promotional lottery for the new VWS retail store.22 The lottery prize was gift
vouchers worth Rs. 200 ($5) redeemable at the store (see Appendix for the surveyor script). Aside
21In the dictator game, the experimenter asks an individual (sender) to divide a xed amount of money between
herself and another individual (receiver). In the trust game, the money transfer is typically tripled by the experimenter
and the receiver is explicitly asked how much she wishes to send back to the sender.
22Importantly, the lottery protocol was conducted before the Table 4 survey data were collected.
15from banking, VWS undertakes many community interventions and conducts regular promotional
activities in an eort to attract and retain clients. For this reason, our intervention is likely to seem
natural in this setting.
The client was informed that, in addition to her, the lottery included ten clients from dierent
VWS branches, which she was therefore unlikely to know. If she agreed to enter the draw (all clients
agreed), then she was given the opportunity to enter any number of other members from her rst
VWS group into the same draw. Any group member she entered into the lottery would receive a
lottery ticket delivered to her house and be told whom it was from. She was told that the other ten
participants would not be given the opportunity to add individuals to the lottery.
To clarify how ticket-giving inuenced her odds of winning, the client was shown detailed
payo matrices (see Figure 3). Enumerators explained that she could potentially increase the
number of lottery participants from 11 to as many as 20, thereby increasing the fraction of group
members in the draw from 9% to up to 50% while decreasing her individual probability of winning
from 9% to as low as 5%.
A client belonging to a ten-member group made nine pair-wise choices. Similar to trust and
dictator games, a member who received a ticket was not required to share her winnings. In the
absence of any sharing arrangements, the Nash outcome is to not give any tickets. Ticket-giving
increases a client's expected payo only if she trusts the recipient to share lottery earnings.
While alternative sharing arrangements are feasible, for expositional ease, we consider the
simple case of pairwise cooperation when the client (or sender) gives a single group member (receiver)
a ticket. For this pair, expected joint earnings increase since their joint chances of winning the lottery
rise from 9% to 17%. There are mutual gains from cooperation (if the receiver shares half of her
earnings, the sender's expected lottery earnings rise from Rs.18 to 25 and the receiver's expected
earnings rise from Rs.0 to 8.3), but costs to the sender if the receiver does not plan to share earnings
with her (in which case the sender's expected lottery earnings fall since her individual probability
of winning the lottery declines from 9% to 8% as the pool of lottery entrants rises to twelve).
Appendix Figure 2 illustrates how ticket-giving changes a client's expected payo. The top
16line shows her expected payo when the receiver shares half her winnings with the client, and the
bottom line shows the reduction in her payo if no receiver shares. The gure also illustrates a key
dierence between our lottery and the trust game: Pairwise returns in the lottery depend on total
tickets given. If the sender trusts all other group members equally then she would give equally to
all group members. However, if trust of group members varies, then recognition of this externality
will further constrain ticket-giving to less trusted group members.23
Finally, to isolate cooperative from purely altruistic motives for giving tickets, our experiment
varied the divisibility of the lottery prize. For a randomly chosen half of participants, the lottery
prize was one Rs. 200 voucher, while for the other half it consisted of four Rs. 50 vouchers.
Appendix Figure 3 provides pictures of these vouchers. A voucher could only be redeemed by one
client and all vouchers expired within two weeks.
4.2 Predictions
Stronger social ties should positively impact pro-social behavior. Hence,
Prediction 1 Higher meeting frequency in the rst loan cycle will increase ticket-giving.
Ticket-giving could increase for two broad reasons. First, in a setting in which clients lack
access to explicit binding contracts, an increase in the frequency of interaction can enable a pair of
clients to devise and implement punishment and reward strategies that sustain reciprocal economic
arrangements, including informal insurance schemes (Karlan et al., 2009; Besley and Coate, 1995;
Ambrus et al., 2010). Alternatively, more frequent meetings may increase a client's unconditional
altruism towards other group members. To distinguish between these two possibilities, we exploit
random variation in the divisibility of the lottery prize and make use of baseline heterogeneity across
clients in self-reported nancial autonomy to make transfers, both of which should inuence the
ticket-giver's expectations of reciprocal ties. Neither a more divisible lottery prize nor the receiver's
ability to make transfers should induce greater ticket-giving unless the sender cares about the ease
23It is also the case that, in our game, sender's action and payos are stochastically related which also dierentiates
it from the classic trust game.
17of reciprocal transfers. Hence,
Prediction 2 If the primary channel is (unconditional) altruism, then the incidence of ticket-giving
will be independent of perceived ability of the receiver to reciprocate.
Meeting more frequently during the initial loan cycle can encourage reciprocal arrangements
between client pairs in multiple ways. Under certain circumstances more frequent meeting may
increase the scope of cooperation by improving clients' ability to monitor other members' actions.
Consider the case in which members can inuence their income through hidden actions. If dierent
actions by members at time t imply dierent initial conditions for the income generation process
between t and t +  (where  is the time period between two meetings), observing income (at
meetings) provides a public signal of a member's action (Costa, 2007).24 Hence, higher frequency
of meeting can improve monitoring in the sense of increased precision of the public signals.
Meeting more often can also change individuals' eective discount factor. In a repeated
game framework, the suitable use of punishment strategies (e.g. grim trigger strategy) can sustain
cooperation among suciently patient individuals (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986); for application
to informal insurance see Coate and Ravallion (1993)). Here, a higher frequency of meeting can be
modeled as reducing the period length between each repetition of the stage game. With perfect
monitoring, this is equivalent to raising the eective discount factor of pair members, which makes
it more likely that relatively impatient members can sustain cooperation. The positive returns to
mandating more frequent meeting will persist as long as meetings continue to reduce the expected
duration between repeat interactions. Hence,
Prediction 3 Increases in ticket-giving among weekly clients will be concentrated among those who
are relatively impatient only if the channel is improved reciprocal sharing arrangements.
An alternative channel through which repeat interaction at the start of a relationship can
facilitate reciprocity is by hastening learning about other group members' ability and willingness
to cooperate. Such a learning-based story by itself would imply that returns to mandating frequent
24If actions do not dierentiate initial conditions, higher frequency signals may not increase the reliability of
information extracted from public signals (D. Abreu and Pearce, 1991; Fudenberg and Levine, 2009).
18interaction will diminish over time. To evaluate the importance of learning about types in explaining
our results, we exploit the following fact: At the time of our lottery, a subset of clients were on
a subsequent loan cycle in which they had been re-randomized onto weekly or monthly schedules.
This allows us to test the following prediction:
Prediction 4 If the primary channel is learning, the eect of more frequent interaction will be
signicantly lower in future loan cycles.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Determinants of Ticket-Giving
Our primary outcome of interest is ticket-giving. For each member of a client's rst loan group, we
recorded whether the participant entered her into the lottery. In total, 57% of participants gave
at least one ticket, which is very similar to individual propensity to give in dictator games (Levitt
and List, 2009). To see how individual and pairwise characteristics, including meeting frequency,
predict ticket-giving by lottery client i in group g, we pool our sample of weekly and monthly lottery
clients and estimate:
ygmi = Xi1 + Xim2 + Xm3 + g + g + gmi (4)
where ygmi denotes whether client i gave group-member m a ticket. We are interested in the
inuence of sender characteristics (Xi), receiver characteristics (Xm), and pairwise characteristics
(Xim). All regressions include loan ocer (g) and month of group formation (g) xed eects.
The basic patterns in the data are broadly consistent with ndings in the trust and dictator
game literatures. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that educated clients are more likely to give and
receive tickets. Richer respondents, those who state in baseline that they can make transfers outside
of their household (nancial control), and the group leader receive more tickets. In contrast, re-
spondents who participate in community and political events are more likely to give but not receive
tickets. Finally, ticket-giving is higher when both members are impatient.25 In column (2), we
25We measure baseline impatience with a series of questions where the client chooses between Rs. 200 today versus
19distinguish between pairs on the basis of initial social distance. As expected, ticket-giving falls with
social distance: Neighbors are much less likely to receive a ticket than friends or family members,
and group members that were previously unknown rarely receive tickets (the unconstrained means
across these three categories are roughly 25%, 53%, and 11%).
4.3.2 Initial Meeting Frequency and Ticket-Giving
Next we examine whether ticket-giving behavior varied systematically with initial meeting fre-
quency. Figure 4 shows the distribution of tickets for weekly and monthly clients (in percentage
terms to account for group size dierences). After zero tickets, the fraction of group members that
receives tickets declines gradually and then levels out after 60%. Weekly clients are substantially
less likely to give no tickets and more likely to give tickets to more than half of their group.
In Table 5 we provide regression results of the form given by equation (2). Columns (1) - (4)
present results for clients oered the divisible lottery prize while columns (5) - (8) show results for
clients randomized to the lottery with the less divisible prize. A comparison of columns (1) and
(5) shows that, relative to her monthly counterpart, a client in a weekly group is signicantly more
likely to give a ticket to a group member if and only if the lottery prize is divisible. Weekly clients in
the divisible randomization are 67% more likely to give tickets than monthly clients, whereas there
is almost no dierence between monthly and weekly clients when the prize comes in the form of one
large voucher.26 Figure 5 shows four loan group networks that highlight the empirical ticket-giving
patterns found in the data (the full set of ticket-giving networks are shown in Appendix Figure 4).
Weekly clients' higher propensity to give tickets is reected in the higher relative connectedness of
the weekly networks in the divisible (i.e., circular nodes) but not the indivisible (i.e., square nodes)
gift voucher randomization. Signicantly higher ticket-giving among weekly clients when the lottery
prize is easily divisible suggests that more frequent meetings increased ticket-giving by increasing
between Rs. 210 and Rs. 250 in a month.
26In the pooled sample, the estimate of the coecient on the interaction between weekly and divisible prize is
similar in magnitude but statistically insignicant, with a t-statistic of 1.54.
20expectations of reciprocity.27 If frequent meetings had only increased unconditional altruism, then
ticket-giving would be independent of voucher divisibility.
In columns (2) and (6), we examine whether ticket-giving is sensitive to a client's subjective
discount rate. If expectations of reciprocal transfers sustain ticket-giving, ticket-giving should only
be observed among suciently patient client pairs, and more frequent interaction can potentially
allow relatively impatient pairs to sustain cooperation. To investigate this, we create a dummy that
equals one if both members of a pair prefer Rs. 200 today to Rs. 250 in a month. In column (2),
we observe that weekly meetings make it more likely that impatient pairs engage in ticket-giving:
the coecient estimate on the interaction between weekly and impatience is large and statistically
signicant. Again, this relationship is only present for clients assigned to the divisible lottery prize,
consistent with the fact that ticket-giving is no greater for weekly clients when the prize is less
divisible. This pattern suggests that risk-sharing concerns underlie increased ticket-giving among
weekly clients, since impatience should not inuence unconditionally altruistic behavior.28
In columns (3) and (7), we examine whether ticket giving is sensitive to the level of nancial
control exercised by the receiver. In total, 89% of clients responded armatively to the baseline
survey question, \If a close relative like your parents or siblings fell sick and needed money, would
you be able to lend money to that relative, if you had the extra money?" If risk-sharing motivates
the higher level of ticket-giving observed in the divisible voucher case, and assuming that this
characteristic is to some extent observable to other members, we would expect a client to avoid
giving tickets to those who are unable to reciprocate. In line with this, we see that marginal ticket-
giving is concentrated among the set of potential receivers who report that they have the nancial
independence to make transfers outside of the household.
Finally, in columns (4) and (8), we examine whether the weekly eect diers by initial social
27Anecdotal evidence from conversations with clients also suggested that they believed multiple vouchers increased
the likelihood that those they gave tickets to would share any future winnings.
28We hypothesize that the net positive eect of pairwise impatience on ticket giving among weekly clients results
from impatient clients likely having smaller social networks before the start of the loan cycle, and consequently
having higher demand for risk-sharing arrangements.
21distance. The coecient estimates on the interaction terms indicate that increased ticket-giving
by weekly clients is driven by increased giving to close neighbors and distant family. The fact that
increased ticket-giving by weekly clients is concentrated among the categories of pairs in which we
also observe a signicant eect on social contact (Table 2) is consistent with our interpretation
that higher long-run social contact increased propensity to form risk-sharing arrangements. The
fact that moving from a monthly to a weekly repayment schedule did not inuence ticket-giving
to close family and friends provides an important placebo check: For immediate family members
or old friends, repayment schedules should not inuence learning or monitoring since these pairs
presumably know each other well and see each other often outside of meetings. Also consistent with
this is the fact that ticket-giving is no higher among weekly relative to monthly clients who report
that they never see one another: Both sets of clients give tickets to roughly 15% of group members
whom they have not seen at all in the past 30 days.29
The fact that we observe no dierence among monthly clients' ticket-giving across the two
voucher categories, along with the fact that for monthly clients ticket-giving is independent of
impatience and ability to reciprocate, suggests that either ticket-giving among these members is not
primarily motivated by reciprocity, or that only marginal risk-sharing arrangements are sensitive to
small barriers to trust such as prize divisibility. A few empirical patterns support this interpretation:
First, 61% of tickets given by monthly clients do not appear to be reciprocal arrangements, based
on the fact that they are given either to individuals they have not seen in the last 30 days at the
time of the lottery or from whom they claim they would not ask for help in case of emergency, or
to immediate family members. Second, survey data indicate that monthly meetings did not lead
to long-run changes in social capital, indicating an absence of relatively new informal risk-sharing
arrangements among monthly clients. For instance, monthly group members are no more likely to
report giving or receiving transfers to individuals outside of the immediate family between baseline
and follow-up (unreported).
To examine whether ticket-giving was associated with reciprocal transfers, six months after
29Authors' tabulations.
22the lottery, we surveyed 39 of the 47 clients who received a ticket from a group member and won that
lottery.30. Although we do not observe explicit voucher-sharing (the winners always redeemed their
vouchers as opposed to giving them away), nearly all clients (85%) remembered who gave them
their ticket, and a quarter reported greater willingness to share post-lottery. We also observe a
signicant dierence across weekly and monthly clients, consistent with higher rates of risk-sharing
relative to altruism among ticket-givers { 7/23 (30.4%) of weekly clients but only 1/16 (6.3%) of
monthly clients report such willingness.31
4.3.3 Hastening versus Sustaining Cooperation
As explained in Section 4.2, more frequent interaction may help sustain cooperative arrangements
indenitely, or it may simply hasten the formation of cooperative arrangements through more rapid
learning about client types. One basic piece of evidence against the learning story is that, at the
time of the lottery, the majority (69%) of clients have been in loan groups together for almost two
years, by which point types should arguably be revealed even among those who only met monthly
for the rst several months (during the experiment).
To further disentangle these two channels, we exploit experimental variation in meeting fre-
quency at two dierent points in time. At the time of our lottery, roughly a third of the clients (137
out of 432) were on a subsequent VWS loan cycle in which groups were re-randomized into weekly
and monthly meetings (see Appendix Figure 1). VWS has a preference for keeping client groups
together across cycles, but group members are replaced when there is drop out. On average, 60%
of current group members were also in the rst loan group.
We consider the sub-sample of 48 third loan cycle clients who had been on the weekly schedule
in the rst intervention and examine whether current meeting frequency inuences current levels of
30Among this subset of "indirect" lottery winners, 25 were in weekly and 22 were in monthly groups.
31The specic question was, \If your friend asked to borrow money or goods from you in the future, do you think
you are more, less, or equally likely to share with her than you were before the lottery?" In terms of actual sharing,
the most commonly shared goods (post-lottery) were food and sarees. In two cases, winners reported lending money
to the group member who had given them the ticket.
23cooperation. This allows us to observe whether forcing clients who already know each other well to
continue interacting regularly further increases cooperation. If so, then it is likely that, in addition
to any short-run learning eects that hasten cooperation between members, meeting frequency has
persistent benets via monitoring or discount rate channels.
For this subset of clients, we use pairwise data on ticket-giving to estimate
ygmi = 1W
c
g + 1g + 2Dg + g + gmi (5)
where W c
g is an indicator variable for the client being on a weekly repayment schedule in the current
loan cycle. The other variables are dened as in equations (1) and (2). Given the reduced sample
size we report regressions without controls (we observe similar but noisier estimates with controls).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that clients in loan groups that were randomly assigned
to the weekly schedule in both the rst and current loan cycle (\weekly-weekly") currently see one
another signicantly more often both at MFI meetings and outside of meetings than clients initially
on the weekly schedule but later assigned to the monthly schedule (\weekly-monthly").32
Correspondingly, a weekly-weekly client is 29% more likely to engage in pro-social behavior
than a weekly-monthly client when the prize is easily divisible (column 3). As before, we nd
no evidence of increased giving for the indivisible voucher option (column 4). We interpret the
dierence for weekly-weekly clients in column (3) as evidence that repeated interactions among
loan group members helps sustain cooperative arrangements in the long run.
While the period over which learning about other clients can occur is uncertain, it is important
to note that, by the time of the survey, clients in this subsample had been interacting regularly
for 2.5 loan cycles during which time they saw each other weekly for at least six months and every
other week for at least six months more. Consistent with this, we see no dierence across weekly-
32In column (1), the dependent variable is the number of required MFI meetings across the rst and current
intervention (at the time of the survey). At the time of the lottery, a weekly-monthly client had met, on average,
41 times, while a weekly-weekly client had met roughly 30% more often. Further, the likelihood of a client having
group members from the rst loan in her current group is independent of repayment frequency (unreported).
24weekly and weekly-monthly clients' in the propensity to remember the names of their rst loan
group members at the time of survey (column 5).
4.4 Social Capital and Default
The above evidence suggests that ticket-giving between clients reects reciprocal economic ties.
Further, the strength of these ties is inuenced by group composition and meeting frequency during
the lottery client's rst loan cycle. Based on these patterns, we can directly estimate the eect of
these ties on default risk using an instrumental variables (IV) approach in which random assignment
to a weekly group in the rst loan cycle and having a distant relative or neighbor as a group member
is used as an instrument for ticket-giving. The second stage equation is:
yim = 1tim + 2pim + 1Wg + 1g + 2Dg + g + gmi (6)
where tim is an indicator variable that equals one if either member of the pair gave a ticket and
pim is an indicator variable that equals one if the members are either close neighbors or distant
relatives. The other variables are as dened in equation (5).
The rst stage equation takes the form
tim = 1pim + 2Wg + 3pim  Wg + 4g + 5Dg + g + gmi: (7)
The excluded instrument is the interaction between the weekly indicator (for rst loan cycle) and
the pair being distant relatives or close neighbors.
The rst stage estimates are reported in column (1) of Table 7. Client pairs consisting of
distant relatives or close neighbors are 14% more likely to engage in ticket-giving if they were
randomly assigned to a weekly group in their rst loan cycle. The 2SLS estimates are reported
in column (2). The likelihood that at least one member of the pair defaults in the second loan
cycle is roughly 50% lower and statistically signicant if the pair enjoy reciprocal economic ties, as
25evidenced by ticket-giving in the lottery.33
The validity of the IV estimate depends on the assumption that meeting frequency inuenced
default rates only through the development of social ties. Since our experiment varied both the
frequency of client interaction and the frequency with which they made loan payments and interacted
with the loan ocer, the central concern is that meeting frequency also inuenced clients' nancial
habits. In that case, simply comparing the behavior of weekly and monthly clients does not allow
us to disentangle the eect of social capital from the eect of repayment schedules on default.
For instance, repayment frequency could have inuenced client income through long-run changes
in savings behavior if clients assigned to repay weekly on their rst loan developed better savings
habits that lasted into subsequent loan cycles.34
For this reason, we do not use assignment to weekly groups as the instrument but rather the
dierential impact of being in a weekly group for clients of a specic relationship type { those who
are reasonably close but not extremely so in terms of geography or familial ties. As there is no
obvious reason why the importance of scal discipline or, more generally, loan ocer indoctrination
should depend on this particular group characteristic, the pattern suggests that social capital is
the central channel of inuence. It is also important to keep in mind that both ticket-giving and
default are measured when clients are no longer on their initial repayment schedule. Hence, it is not
the case that, at the time of the lottery, clients in the monthly treatment are struggling to make
larger payments, which could explain their reluctance to give tickets. Perhaps most importantly,
alternative channels of inuence such as nancial habits cannot account for the fact that ticket-
giving within weekly clients is sensitive to voucher divisibility, which was randomly assigned.
33The results are very similar in magnitude and statistically signicant if we estimate these regressions at the client
rather than the pair level.
34While possible that income varied across repayment schedules through small interest rate dierences (weekly
clients faced slightly higher implicit interest rates since they had to repay faster); however, such dierences are very
small and yield opposite predictions to what we nd (weekly clients are more generous and default less).
264.5 The Costs of Building Social Capital
The evidence in Table 7 implies signicant benets to MFIs from building social capital. However,
these benets do not come free given non-trivial transactions costs of meeting four times as often.
For clients, we estimate that weekly meetings entail approximately two additional hours per month,
or 15 hours over the course of an average loan cycle. Meanwhile, banks could cut transactions costs
per client by nearly three-fourths - or reach nearly four times as many clients for the same cost -
by moving from a weekly to a monthly schedule.
In terms of benets default data for the second loan cycle shows that the average client who
was on monthly repayment during her initial loan cycle defaults on Rs. 150 more than the average
client previously on a weekly repayment schedule, which is almost the same as the bank's additional
transaction cost per client of meeting weekly.35 Hence, a conservative back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation suggests that weekly meetings may be cost-eective for a MFI, which explains why MFIs
persist with high frequency repayment schedules despite the higher transactions costs.
Evaluating the social planner's problem is less straightforward since the costs and benets to
clients of meeting weekly are dicult to calculate. The total cost to clients of regular repayment
is likely to exceed the simple time cost of meeting attendance given the additional nancial burden
of making regular installments, and the total benets of increases in social capital are likely to
exceed the reduction in default risk. While these tradeos are dicult to observe, given the wealth
of benets from improved informal insurance and potential externalities from social capital such
as information transfers between clients, it is likely that clients are also better o on a weekly
schedule.36
35We estimate that loan ocers spend an additional 1.5 hours per month per group, which amounts to 3.75% of
their monthly wage for every 10 customers, or Rs. 150. Given that a loan cycle is ten months and contains ten
members, this implies an average cost per client of roughly Rs. 150.
36While there is one potentially important negative externality that we also do not observe { crowd out of other
forms of social capital enjoyed by the client { as argued in Section 3.2, the reduction in client default arguably
captures the net eect of meeting frequency on social capital inside and outside of loan groups.
275 Conclusions
A widely held belief across social scientists in many disciplines is that social interactions encourage
norms of reciprocity and trust. In fact, participation in groups is often used to measure an indi-
vidual's or community's degree of economic cooperation (see, for instance, Narayan and Pritchett,
1999; Alesina and Ferrara, 2002). However, while the notion is theoretically well-grounded, it is
not clear from previous work whether the correlation between social distance and trust reects the
causal eect of interaction on economic cooperation. Using eld experiments, we provide rigor-
ous evidence that repeat interactions can in practice facilitate cooperative behavior by enabling
individuals to sustain reciprocal economic ties.
Further, our results demonstrate that development programs can increase social ties and
enhance social capital among members of a highly localized community in a strikingly short amount
of time. In our study, close neighbors from similar socio-economic backgrounds got to know each
other well enough to cooperate with only the outside stimulus of micro-nance meetings. While
many authors have suggested a link between social capital and MFI default rates, ours is the rst
study to provide rigorous evidence on the role of micronance in building social capital.
Our ndings support the idea that complementarities in social capital acquisition creates the
possibility of multiple equilibria (Glaeser et al., 2002). This, in turn, suggests potentially large gains
from policies which facilitate interaction and help coordinate social capital investments, especially
in low income countries where formal risk-sharing arrangements remain limited. By broadening and
strengthening social networks the group-based lending model used by MFIs may provide an impor-
tant impetus for the economic development of poor communities and the empowerment of women.
While we cannot expect all communities to respond equally to such stimuli, our ndings are likely
to be most readily applicable to the fast-growing urban and peri-urban areas of cities in developing
countries (such as Kolkata) where micronance is spreading the most rapidly. Understanding how
other development programs or public policies can be designed to enhance the social infrastructure
of poor communities is a promising area of future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 VWS Protocol
Group Formation: The loan ocer surveys the demographic make-up of a potential neighborhood.
If appropriate, then s/he conducts a meeting to inform potential clients about the VWS loan product
and invites them to a ve-day Continuous Group Training (CGT) program. The program runs an
hour each day, and introduces clients to the benets and responsibilities associated with the loan
product. Each potential loan group is assigned a separate CGT program. At the end of the CGT,
the loan ocer forms women who were considered suciently informed and interested into a group,
identies (with group members) a group leader and oers each member of the group a loan.37
Oath The following oath is read out by members in each meeting, \1. We will abide by the rules
and regulation of VWS and try to sort out the problems and disturbances in our locality. 2. We
37Group leader selection criteria include: (i) communicates well with group members and VWS sta; (ii) is
responsible and well accepted by group members; (iii) has a house or place to organize group meeting.
32will send all our children to school. 3. We will maintain good health and keep our houses always
neat and clean. 4. We will neither accept nor give any dowry. 5. We will lead a simple life and
avoid unnecessary expenses. 6. We will attend the group meeting in time and act as a joint liability
group 7. We will use the loan amount for the right purpose."
6.2 Lottery Protocol
Probability Script for Main Lottery: In the lottery, you and ten other VWS clients will receive
a ticket. Additionally, you have the option of selecting additional members of your VWS loan group
that you would like us to give tickets to. You can tell us not to give anybody else in your VWS
loan group a ticket, you can tell us to give each person in your group a ticket, or you can tell us
which specic members you would like us to give tickets to.
We will review the eect giving out tickets has on chances of winning. In picture 1 in which you
donot give out any tickets to members of your VWS group, you would have a 1 in 11 chance of
winning. In picture 2, you choose to give a ticket to four other members of your VWS group and
there are 15 tickets total. In that case, you would have a 1 in 15 chance of winning and each of
the members of your VWS group you gave a ticket to would have a 1 in 15 chance of winning. In
picture 3, you give a ticket to nine other members of your VWS group and there are 20 tickets total.
In that case, you would have a 1 in 20 chance of winning and each of the members of your VWS
group you gave a ticket to would have a 1 in 20 chance of winning.
These are only a few examples of what odds of winning you may have after you decide how many
tickets to give out. Remember that whether or not you give out tickets to other members of your
rst VWS loan group, you keep the lottery ticket we have given you. Now, before we continue, do
you have any questions about how the lottery will work?
Additional Script for one 200 Rs. voucher: If you win the lottery, you will receive a single
200 Rs. voucher redeemable at the VWS village bazaar. You can use the voucher yourself or give
it to someone in your rst VWS group. Either way, the voucher must be used within two weeks.
33Additionally, only one person can redeem the voucher at the VWS store and the entire value of the
voucher must be used when the voucher is redeemed (so, for example, you cannot use 100 Rs. one
day and save 100 Rs. for another day). To summarize, if you win the lottery, you will be asked to
sign the 200 Rs. voucher when you receive it. However, you are still free to decide whether to keep
or give away the voucher that you receive.
Additional Script for four 50 Rs. vouchers: If you win the lottery, you will receive four 50 Rs.
vouchers redeemable at the VWS village bazaar. You may choose to use all four vouchers yourself,
to give away 1-3 of the vouchers to members of your rst VWS group and keep the rest for yourself,
or to give away all of the vouchers to members of your rst VWS group. In any case, the vouchers
must be used within two weeks. Additionally, the entire value of each of the vouchers must be used
when the voucher is redeemed (so, for example, you cannot use 25 Rs. of a 50 Rs. voucher one day
and save 25 Rs. for another day). To summarize, if you win the lottery, you will be asked to sign
each of the 50 Rs. vouchers when you receive them. However, you are still free to decide whether
to give away or keep each of the four vouchers that you receive.
6.3 Sample and Loan Terms
Our experimental sample consisted of 1026 clients who each received a Rs. 4000 loan and were
randomized into either a weekly or monthly group. Of these, 707 chose to take out a second loan
within 104 weeks of having taken out the rst loan. 458 were on a fortnightly repayment schedule
without an initial delay, and 249 were on a fortnightly repayment schedule with a two month delay
before the rst loan repayment was due. Of these, 137 took out a third loan where they were
re-randomized into monthly or weekly loans. Of these, 48 clients had been on a weekly schedule in
their rst loan cycle and these clients enter the sample in Table 6. For these clients, the average
loan size in the third loan cycle was Rs. 9600.
We piloted the lottery among 128 clients and then randomly drew a sample of 450 clients from
the remaining 900. Of these, two had died and sixteen were away from the city.
34Weekly Monthly
All 
Clients
Lottery 
Clients
4-Rs. 50 
Voucher Prize
1-Rs. 200 
Voucher Prize
D
i
f (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Group-level 
Number of Clients 10.233 10.300 -0.067 -0.063
[0.689] [0.709] (0.153) (0.156)
Month of Formation 5.667 5.657 0.010 0.043
[1.561] [1.371] (0.312) (0.315)
Fraction Muslim 0.000 0.077 -0.077 -0.079
[0.000] [0.192] (0.045) (0.046)
N 30 70
Panel B: Client-level 
Age 33.376 33.461 -0.085 -1.056 -1.75 -0.328
[8.330] [8.387] (0.683) (0.765) (1.086) (1.200)
Literate 0.853 0.838 0.015 0.021 0.030 0.011
[0.355] [0.369] (0.031) (0.042) (0.052) (0.055)
6.556 6.670 -0.115 0.138 0.215 0.059
[3.484] [3.638] (0.367) (0.491) (0.639) (0.640)
Married 0.876 0.865 0.011 -0.011 -0.018 -0.004
[0.330] [0.342] (0.025) (0.035) (0.057) (0.043)
Household Size 3.974 3.915 0.058 0.059 0.233 -0.124
[1.148] [1.410] (0.093) (0.135) (0.207) (0.174)
0.585 0.530 0.055 0.043 -0.004 0.092
[0.494] [0.499] (0.046) (0.061) (0.071) (0.081)
3616 2445 1171 -917 -1646 -152
[31086] [12286] (1876) (811) (1322) (894)
Value of Assets (Rs.) 10704 9038 1666 547 3042 -2071
[27016] [21923] (1953) (2118) (3849) (1597)
0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.000
[0.000] [0.038] (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000)
15.327 16.997 -1.670 -2.635 -3.326 -1.910
[10.275] [10.152] (0.739) (0.985) (1.320) (1.579)
Impatient 0.438 0.454 -0.016 -0.035 -0.115 0.05
[0.497] [0.498] (0.060) (0.066) (0.081) (0.087)
Financial Control 0.905 0.868 0.038 0.024 0.034 0.014
[0.293] [0.339] (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.068)
Fraction Distant Relatives 0.067 0.052 0.015 0.005 0.019 -0.010
[0.121] [0.106] (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
Fraction Close Neighbors 0.109 0.107 0.001 -0.001 0.055 -0.059
[0.200] [0.167] (0.033) (0.034) (0.043) (0.029)
Fraction Distant Neighbors 0.385 0.418 -0.033 -0.029 -0.084 0.029
[0.324] [0.323] (0.045) (0.048) (0.053) (0.062)
Fraction Didn't Know 0.334 0.326 0.008 0.007 -0.014 0.028
[0.339] [0.346] (0.048) (0.054) (0.059) (0.069)
N 306 710 1016 428 219 209 N
Notes
1
2 Columns (3)-(6) report tests of differences of means (weekly minus monthly) for the subsamples. Standard errors are clustered by group.
Years Living in Neighborhood
Month of Formation refers to calendar month of group formation ("4" for groups formed in April, 2006, and so on).   Impatient is whether client prefers 
"Rs. 200  now" over "Rs. 250  in one month." Close Neighbors are  neighbors living within 50m. The omitted relationship type is Close Family/Friends, 
and all relationship types are defined at time of loan group formation. Financial Control is whether clients responds "Yes" to "If a close relative like your 
parents or siblings fell sick and needed money would you be able to lend money to that relative, if you had the extra money?"
Highest School Class 
Completed
Member Worked for Pay in Last 
7 Days
Balance of Household Savings 
Account
Table 1. Group-level and Client-level Randomization Check 
Summary Statistics- All Clients Weekly/Monthly Difference
Number of Transfers Made to 
Group MembersShort Run 
Index
Trust Group 
Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weekly 4.599 0.105 0.044 0.829 -1.414 0.269 0.065
(0.246) (0.045) (0.130) (0.601) (1.971) (0.118) (0.028)
Distant Relative 0.011 0.296
(0.125) (2.005)
Close Neighbor (<50m) -0.413 -3.443
(0.106) (1.576)
Distant Neighbor(>50m) -0.676 -8.593
(0.080) (1.319)
Didn't Know  -0.919 -11.740
(0.082) (1.365)
Weekly*Distant Relative 0.344 7.725
(0.173) (3.281)
Weekly*Close Neighbor 0.211 4.455
(0.182) (2.766)
Weekly*Distant Neighbor 0.031 2.428
(0.139) (2.132)
Weekly*Didn't Know 0.017 1.181
(0.133) (2.054)
Specification Group-level Pairwise Pairwise Pairwise Pairwise Client-level Pairwise
4.462 4.320 0.226
[9.728] [1.132] [0.418]
N 100 3134 3134 3134 3134 432 4018
Notes:
1
2
3
4
Table 2.  Meeting Frequency and Social Contact/ Trust Measures
Would Help 
if Sick
Mean of Monthly
Short Run Index averages the normalized group mean of four client indicator variables:“Have all of your group members visited 
your house?", “Have you ever visited houses of all group members?”, “Do you know the names of the family members of your 
group members?", and “Do you know if any of your group members had relatives come over in last 30 days?" Long Run Index 
averages three (normalized) client-level variables: Total Times Met (reference period past 30 days), (2) "Do you still talk to X  
about her family," and (3)  "During the most recent Durga Puja, did you attend any part of the festival with X?" Trust Group 
Member is the client response on a 1 to 5 scale, increasing in the likelihood that the average group member would return a wallet 
with Rs. 200 that was found on the street. Would Help if Sick is the indicator variable "If you had a sick family member and had to 
leave your house for a few hours for an emergency, would you ask X  to come to your home and look after him/her?" 
Social Contact
Mean of monthly is average of the dependent variable for monthly groups/clients, standard deviations in brackets.
Long Run Index Total Times Met
Distant Relative, Close Neighbor, Distant Neighbor, and Didn't Know are responses to pairwise relationship type before joining 
VWS. The omitted group is close family/friends. 
In Columns (2)-(5) we include one response per loan group pair. Column (1)  regression includes group-level controls (Table 1, 
Panel A). Columns (2)-(7) regressions control, in addition, for client controls (Table 1, Panel B), days between loan disbursement 
and lottery survey, and whether member is group leader. Standard errors are clustered by group in Columns (2)-(7).  
Trust MeasuresNeighbor/ Other 
Relative/ Friend
Close Family/ Other 
Non-Relative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weekly 0.073 0.021 -0.013 -0.083 -0.053
(0.044) (0.051) (0.013) (0.038) (0.039)
0.137
(0.116)
-0.186
(0.099)
Mean of monthly 0.377 0.377 0.018 0.108
[0.485] [0.485] [0.133] [0.301]
N 961 961 1026 707 707
Notes:
1
2
Transfers in Columns (1)-(2) refer to transfers given/received by clients' household in 12 months before first loan endline survey, and are 
indicator variables for whether clients' household gave/received any transfers to/from the relevant groups. Relationship type is defined at 
end of loan cycle for transfers, but is defined before joining VWS for default regression. For each loan, a client is defined as defaulted if 
she has not repaid the total loan amount within forty-four weeks after due date. Data on loan repayment was still collected weekly after the 
end of the loan cycle. 
Regressions include loan officer fixed effects (for that cycle). All regressions include controls for the variables in Table 1. Standard errors 
are clustered at the group-level.
Table 3. Meeting Frequency and Loan Repayment
Second Loan 
Fraction Distant Relatives or Close 
Neighbors in Group
Weekly*Fraction Distant Relatives or 
Close Neighbors in Group
Transfers Default
First Loan (1) (2)
Sender Characteristics
Literate 0.044 0.052
(0.020) (0.019)
Value of Assets (Rs. 10000) 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
I am Group Leader 0.028 -0.002
(0.025) (0.023)
0.226 0.172
(0.046) (0.044)
Receiver Characteristics
Literate 0.033 0.040
(0.019) (0.018)
Value of Assets (Rs. 10000) 0.007 0.006
(0.003) (0.003)
Member is Group Leader 0.101 0.069
(0.022) (0.021)
-0.011 -0.038
(0.043) (0.041)
Financial Control 0.062 0.057
(0.028) (0.026)
Pairwise Characteristics
Both Members are Impatient 0.038 0.030
(0.016) (0.015)
Distant Relative 0.009
(0.034)
Close Neighbor -0.178
(0.029)
Distant Neighbor -0.281
(0.024)
Didn't Know -0.398
(0.024)
N 4018 4018
Notes
1
2
Gave Ticket
Table 4. Determinants of Ticket Giving 
We have (on average) nine observations per client. The dependent variable equals one for a 
group member if the client gave her a ticket. Time Spent on Political Activity/ Community 
Meetings is the indicator variable "Did you spend any time on political activities / attending 
community meetings in the last 24 hours?" 
All regressions include controls for days between loan disbursement and lottery survey, group 
size, and month of group formation fixed effects.
Time Spent on Political Activity / 
Community Meetings
Time Spent on Political Activity / 
Community Meetings(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weekly 0.132 0.131 0.042 0.029 -0.003 -0.005 -0.088 -0.113
(0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.118) (0.052) (0.060) (0.063) (0.107)
Impatient -0.005 0.083
(0.043) (0.051)
Weekly*Impatient 0.153 -0.034
(0.094) (0.080)
Financial Control 0.054 0.025
(0.030) (0.045)
Weekly*Financial Control 0.126 0.079
(0.061) (0.070)
Distant Relative -0.137 -0.051
(0.084) (0.096)
Close Neighbor -0.224 -0.308
(0.077) (0.079)
Distant Neighbor -0.271 -0.384
(0.054) (0.078)
Didn't Know -0.399 -0.475
(0.061) (0.074)
Weekly*Distant Relative 0.421 0.127
(0.140) (0.182)
Weekly*Close Neighbor 0.280 0.228
(0.127) (0.130)
Weekly*Distant Neighbor 0.045 0.187
(0.111) (0.126)
Weekly*Didn't Know 0.122 0.007
(0.111) (0.108)
Mean of monthly 0.196 0.241
[0.397] [0.428]
N 2027 2027 2027 2027 1991 1991 1991 1991
Notes
2
Table 5. Meeting Frequency and Ticket-Giving
Regressions include (i) a control for days between loan disbursement and lottery survey, and (ii) controls for 
the variables in Table 1, Panels A-B. Regressions also include controls for loan group leader. Standard errors 
are clustered at the group-level.
Gave Ticket
1 For each client in the sample we have (on average) nine observations. See notes to Table 4 for definition of 
dependent variable, and notes to Table 1 for Impatient, Financial Control, and relationship type definitions. 
4-Rs. 50 Vouchers 1-Rs. 200 Voucher4-Rs. 50. 
Vouchers
1-Rs. 200  
Voucher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
12.572 1.109 0.416 -0.150 0.011
(2.455) (0.505) (0.099) (0.175) (0.095)
41.388 0.126 0.281 0.669
[4.220] [0.333] [0.451] [0.472]
Specification Client-level Client-level Pairwise Pairwise Pairwise
N 48 47 251 204 455
Notes
1
2
Mean of Weekly in First Loan, Monthly  in 
Current Loan
Gave Ticket Number of Pre-
Lottery MFI 
Meetings Attended
Current Social 
Contact Index 
Member 
Remember
Table 6. Meeting Frequency across Loan Cycles and Pro-Social Behavior
Regressions include month of First and Current Loan group formation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the First Loan group-
level. 
The sample is weekly clients with a VWS loan at the time of lottery. Number of Pre-Lottery MFI Meetings is the total number of times 
the client's First Loan and Current Loan group met to repay before the client was surveyed for lottery. Social Contact Index is the 
average of the normalized versions of five Current Loan group meeting variables: "For how many members of your group do you know 
whether there is a marriage ceremony in the family in the coming 30 days?", "How many group members have you visited in their 
houses in the last 2 weeks?", "How many group members have visited you in your house in the last 2 weeks?",  "How many people in 
the group did you talk to about business matters in the last 2 weeks?", and "How many people in the group did you talk to about personal 
matters in the last 2 weeks?" For each variable, we use client-level average across all observations before month 4 of the current loan 
cycle (when the  average client was surveyed for the lottery). Gave Ticket is as defined in notes to Table 4.  Member Remember is the 
indicator variable "Do you remember this group member?" Data in Columns (1)-(2), was collected over the course of Current Loan 
Cycle, while data in Columns (3)-(5) was collected at the time of lottery.
Weekly in First Loan,  Weekly in Current LoanGave Ticket
Second Loan Default- 
IV (Pairwise)
(1) (2)
Weekly 0.006 -0.070
(0.051) (0.057)
Distant Relative or Close Neighbor -0.075 -0.020
(0.048) (0.046)
0.143
(0.053)
Gave Ticket -0.478
(0.178)
N 2007 2007
Notes
1
2
Weekly*Distant Relative or Close 
Neighbor
We report an IV result in Column (2) in which we instrument for Gave Ticket with 
Weekly*Distant Relative or Close Neighbor. The first stage of the IV is given in 
Column (1). The dependent variable in Column (2) is an indicator variable for 
whether either sender or receiver defaulted. 
All regressions include controls for the variables in Table 1, Panels A-B and for loan 
group leader. Regressions also include controls for second loan officer and second 
loan month of loan disbursement. Standard errors are clustered at both the first and 
second loan group level. 
 
Table 7. Meeting Frequency and Loan RepaymentWeekly Monthly
All 
Clients
Lottery 
Clients
4-Rs. 50 
Voucher Prize
1-Rs. 200 
Voucher Prize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.007 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.016 0.000
[0.081] [0.038] (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.000)
Owns Enterprise 0.755 0.680 0.075 0.147 0.152 0.141
[0.431] [0.467] (0.047) (0.061) (0.077) (0.081)
Owns Home 0.775 0.792 -0.017 -0.003 -0.089 0.086
[0.419] [0.406] (0.041) (0.047) (0.061) (0.064)
0.065 0.054 0.012 -0.018 -0.055 0.021
[0.248] [0.225] (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.044)
0.343 0.277 0.066 0.050 0.022 0.080
[0.476] [0.448] (0.044) (0.066) (0.075) (0.080)
4.868 4.617 0.251 -0.253 -1.430 1.015
[4.328] [4.597] (0.531) (0.682) (0.808) (1.132)
7.677 5.507 2.171 1.050 -1.575 3.604
[14.363] [10.848] (2.273) (2.329) (2.543) (3.709)
3514 4080 -566 -673 -977 -354
[5561] [12428] (613) (961) (1442) (1061)
Education Expenditures 5011 4513 498 -221 -132 -314
[5515] [5693] (403) (654) (853) (870)
0.376 0.342 0.034 0.053 0.067 0.039
[0.485] [0.475] (0.045) (0.065) (0.081) (0.076)
1460 1560 -100 25 114 -68
[2998] [2602] (251) (331) (385) (471)
-0.009
(0.038)
N 306 710 N
Notes
1
Number of Transfers Received 
from Group Members
Has Played Lottery in Past 12 
Months
Fixed Salary Earned by 
Household
Total Tranfers into Households
Total Tranfers out of  
Households
Appendix Table 1. Additional Client-level Control Variables
Has Insurance
Fraction of Clients Surveyed
Summary Statistics- All Clients Weekly/Monthly Difference
Health Expenditures
Illness in Past 12 Months
Illness in Past 12 Months is an indicator variable for whether any household member has been ill in past 12 months. 
Total Transfers into/ out of Household is defined for households which made/received at least one transfer over past 12 
months. Columns (3)-(6) report tests of differences of means for the different subsamples. Standard errors are clustered 
by group. Fraction of clients surveyed is the group-level fraction of clients receiving lottery survey.All Members 
Visited  Me in 
My Home
I Visited  All 
Members in 
Their Homes
Know Names 
of Family 
Members 
Know if 
Relatives 
Visited
Total Times 
Met
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weekly 0.947 0.940 0.945 0.103 0.829 0.060 0.071
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.013) (0.601) (0.026) (0.038)
0.101 0.105 0.100 0.003 4.463 0.183 0.166
[0.246] [0.246] [0.244] [0.015] [9.732] [0.387] [0.372]
N 100 100 100 100 3134 4018 4018
Notes:
1
2
3
Mean of 
Monthly
Short Run Long Run
Mean of monthly is average value of dependent variable for monthly clients with standard deviations in brackets.
Columns (1)-(4) regressions include group-level controls (Table 1, panel A). Columns (5)-(7) regressions control, in addition, for 
client-level controls (Table 1, Panel B), days between loan disbursement and lottery survey, and whether member is group leader. 
Appendix Table 2.  Meeting Frequency and  Social Interaction
Dependent variables in Columns (1)-(7) are as defined in Table 2.
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Figure 1. Building Social Capital over the Loan Cycle 
Visited All Members  Knew Relative Visited Notes:
In Picture 3, you choose to have us give a ticket to nine other members of your VWS group and there are 20 tickets total. 
In that case, you would have a 1 in 20 chance of winning and each of the members of your VWS group you gave a ticket 
to would have a 1 in 20 chance of winning." 
Figure 3. Winning Probabilities
This picture was used to explain how ticket-giving affected lottery probabilities. The explanation provided was "In Picture 
1 in which you don't give out any tickets to members of your VWS group, you have a 1 in 11 chance  of winning. 
In Picture 2, you choose to have us give a ticket to four other members of your VWS group and there are 15 tickets total. 
In that case, you would have a 1 in 15 chance of winning and each of the members of your VWS group you gave a ticket 
to would have a 1 in 15 chance of winning. Panel B: Monthly Clients
Figure 5. Network Structures
Circular nodes are clients from the 4-Rs. 50 gift voucher randomization, square nodes are clients from the 1-Rs. 
200 gift voucher randomization, and triangular nodes are clients who were not surveyed for the lottery. Nodes 
are labelled by the number of tickets given out by client, and edges depict direction of ticket-giving.  
Panel A: Weekly ClientsAppendix Figure 1. Timeline
April-Sept. 
2006 
30 weekly and 70 
monthly loan 
groups formed (307 
weekly and 721 
monthly clients) 
Feb. 2007 
L oan 
groups 
begin 
making 
final 
repayments 
March 2007 
Second loan 
groups 
begin 
forming 
Second loan 
groups begin 
making final 
repayments/ 
Third loan 
groups begin 
forming 
Second loan 
groups 
finish loan 
repayment 
Feb. 2008  Jan.-August 
2009 
Third loan 
groups 
finish loan 
repayment 
July 2008 
Lottery 
experiment 
begins 
August 
2008 0.4282 0
0.1111 1
0.088 2
0.0926 3
0.1181 4
0.0486 5
0.0162 6
0.0255 7
0.0185 8
0.0532 9
Notes: 
Appendix Figure 2 shows the expected returns to the lottery based on ticket-giving decision, and extent of 
reciprocal behavior by ticket recipient.
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Appendix Figure 2. Expected Returns to Lottery by Ticket-
Giving Decision 
No Tickets Shared  Ticket Recipients Share 1/2 Winnings 
Ticket Recipients Don't Share Winnings Note:
Appendix Figure 3. Lottery Vouchers
Clients were randomly offered the choice of joining the 1-Rs. 200.Voucher or the 4-Rs. 50 Voucher lottery. This 
figure shows the final vouchers which were given to the winner of the two lotteries.Panel A: Weekly Clients
Panel B: Monthly Clients
Appendix Figure 4. All Network Structures